Logic and law have much in common in their intentions to pursue theregularities of rational behavior of people as intelligent agents. In the paper, we highlightthree aspects of such agency — a situation as the result of it, the actions of the agentsand the agents themselves. In logic, the intelligent agency is one of its subjects of studyon which it focuses for the sake of in-depth inquiry into its key object consisting of thecategories of value, or logical truth, and inference, or logical consequence. These twocategories may be given different definitions as they appear to be the concepts ofcertain formal theories. In the paper, we demonstrate such logical diversity in theframework of some deontic systems and show what these differences in the definitionsof the concept of consequence mean as regards the deontic logic. Also we discuss anumber of particular implications these diversities in defining key concept of logicalconsequence have on intellectual agency modelling. With the help of these, we arguethat this diversity does not lead to relativism or subjectivism in understanding truth orconsequence. Instead, we conclude that the logical diversity paves the way toargumentation as a kind of communicative interaction of intelligent agents — people,institutions, expert systems, and so forth. Argumentation as a kind of intellectual agencycan provide an effective tool for the implementation of the communicative potential oflegal regulation and serve as a rational mechanism for recognizing the diversity of legalsystems, both institutionalized and personal.