The central question in this article is: What is actually the relationship between human thought, its structure and exercise, and the idea of human rights, which is surely among the most important products of human thinking? In the search for answer number of other questions were considered. The first question was: Why does the theory of mind matter for ethics and law? To answer the second question — What precisely are we talking about? — the concept or idea of a human right as a subclass of moral and legal subjective rights was outlined and clarified. Third, the question: Where do rights come from? — occupied the attention just long enough to substantially understand why an answer to one of the two currently particularly interesting fundamental forms of human rights’ revisionism, the historical, genealogical attack on human rights, leads necessarily beyond the limits of human rights history in the deep waters of the epistemology and ontology of human rights. Also the fourth question: Why are rights justified? — was considered. Fifth, after having sufficiently prepared the ground by the preceding remarks, the core issue of these reflections addressed: What is, after all, the importance of the theory of mind for the project of human rights? Here the second fundamental challenge to the idea of human rights was discussed. This attack stems from the quarters of today’s neuroscientific neo-emotivism, which is interesting in itself and has the advantage that the critique of this form of human rights revisionism has considerable heuristic merits for a constructive account of the theory of mind and the foundations of human rights. The article ends with the disclosure how a theory of human rights could draw from the theory of mind, and more concretely from a mentalist account of ethics and law.