The matching of two understandings of experience of the death, represented in philosophy of law and philosophy of existence is under consideration in given article. In both traditions, the experience of death plays an important normative role though that differs in meaning. Philosophy of law pays attention to the violent death as an experience which human being a priori tries to avoid. In such way this kind of experience stipulates right to life as a priority right. In philosophy of existence future death appears as the experience that allows man to form individuality and implement the possibilities of his/her own being in case when a person is open to such experience. It is shown that ontological interpretation of the experience of violent death allows describing it as one of the modes of being-towards-death in the sense of existential analytics of M. Heidegger, as well as it reveals its normative implications. Consistent disclosure of the specifics of this modus and its normative potential give opportunity to put the question about existential sources of law, which define its regional peculiarities in general.