| Article | Unity and Sense in Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Law |
|---|---|
| Authors | Guest S. |
| Name of magazine | Scientific journal «Philosophy of Law and General Theory of Law» (Ukrainian language) |
| Issue | 1 / 2013 |
| Pages | 354 - 369 |
| Annotation | The article refers to the foundations of R. Dworkin’s legal theory. The author reveals R. Dworkin’s «one right answer thesis» and considers his responses to objections to it. The attention is paid to the concept of the unity of value and objections made to it. It is argued that law is morally pointed. The author clarifies R. Dworkin’s thesis according to which phenomenological account of law is not possible because of law’s evaluative (interpretive) nature. Finally the author shows how the «one right answer thesis» and the unity of value make the best sense of R. Dworkin’s legal theory. |
| Keywords | law, morality, truth, legal reasoning, legal theory. |
| References | |
| Electronic version | Download |