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| Article title | On Rights |
| Authors |
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| Name of magazine | Scientific journal «Philosophy of Law and General Theory of Law» (Ukrainian language) |
| Issue | 1/2013 |
| Сторінки | [99-109] |
| Annotation | This article analyzes the phenomenon of rights as the foundation of the modern legal system. From the point of view of normative practice the author critically rethinks the idea of the weighing the competing legal principles proposed by R. Alexy, and tries to clarify the concept of right according to the different shades in which, as a matter of fact, the idea of a right is interpreted. This effect he puts rights on the six levels of intensity, depending on the configuration of corresponding duties: from the negative permission when some action is simply not prohibited (for example, the right to hear music) to the obligations of certain entities to provide assistance to a person who is willing to take a certain action, but can not do it on their own (for example, the right to be defended by a lawyer). During the rigorous logical analysis of the author argues that the operative intensity of rights does not necessarily coincide with the relative hierarchy of the legal norms by which rights are established, neither with their moral hierarchy. Thus the author reveals the contradictions between the moral sense, which vested rights in the contemporary political and legal discourse and practice to implement them. |
| Keywords | rights, intensity degrees, obligations, normative system. |
| References | |
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