This article provides general theoretical and philosophical-legal analysis of the European Court of Human Rights practice with regard to the protection of the right to privacy. A particular attention is paid to the need to consider the differences between communitarian, liberalistic and potestary interpretations of the legal categories. A high profile is given to coverage of features of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, where, according to the author, the tension on the line of liberalism is most evident — communitarianism: since the right to privacy itself is most liberalistic, i.e. the one that is the core of this political and legal philosophy. Thanks to the decision of the Court, a number of new senses has joined the provision of Article 8, which is an evidence of a «living» nature of the Convention. Today, the trend continues to be observed, covering even more aspects of private life of a person. The recognition by the Strasbourg Court of the positive obligations of the state on implementing the rights guaranteed by Article 8 in addition to its obligation of non-interference in the private sphere of citizens, can be considered not only as evidence of some evolution of legal stance of the ECHR, but as philosophical and legal approaches that formed their basis. Philosophical and legal foundation of the Court’s stance regarding private life is transformed from classical liberal (and even libertarian) principles — to implicit neoliberal premises, which manifests itself in including in the content of the considered conventional law of obligations of the state on taking active steps to ensure its reality and effectiveness.