The article offers the characterization of the constitutional complaint in Poland. After more than twenty years since its introduction into the Polish legal system in 1997, the author describes the normative model of the complaint, its doctrinal interpretation and the problems of application. The constitutional complaint is analyzed through the lens of four main questions: who may submit it to the Constitutional Tribunal (constitutional complaint subject), what the subject matter of the complaint is (constitutional complaint subject matter), under what circumstances it may be done (subsidiary nature of the constitutional complaint) and consequences of consideration of the complaint by the Constitutional Tribunal (individual and public consequences of consideration of the constitutional complaint).

In the context of the Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence and the consequences ensuing therefrom, in the protection of the applicants’ subjective rights the author argues that in Poland the constitutional complaint does not play a significant role in the context of protection of constitutional freedoms and subjective rights. It is an extreme (marginalnym) measure, sporadic and capable of bringing the desired consequences to the applicant only in some situations. The third-rate role of the constitutional complaint in the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms is mainly due to the restrictive introduction (restrykcyjnego zaplanowania) of the complaint in the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997. As a subsidiary (additional) measure against the background of other legal remedies implemented by the Constitutional Tribunal, the constitutional complaint does not entail the immediately resumed protection of the applicant’s rights and freedoms. In order to do so, the applicant should request commencement of proceedings by appealing to the body which has applied the legal provisions that are contrary to the Constitution, and this body independently decides the case which was considered by it. Besides, the practice of the Constitutional Tribunal has formed a restrictive qualification of constitutional complaints received for consideration. About 95 % of the procedural acts submitted to the Constitutional Tribunal as the “constitutional complaint” are not subject to recognition for formal reasons.

The analysis of twenty years of constitutional jurisprudence allows to formulate the conclusions as de lege ferenda. First of all, a focus on the efficiency of the constitutional complaint as a means of protection of an individual’s rights and freedoms requires the technique of the Constitutional Tribunal in the exercise of powers to make decisions of a reformative nature regarding the subject matter of the dispute involving the individual, that is, sentences which solve the conflict, within which legal regulations violating the individual’s constitutional rights and freedoms are applied to the individual.