The article deals with issues which are currently topical for modern law application practice and relate to how legality should be assessed in cases where the State interferes with the right to peaceful possession of property in criminal proceedings where property seizure is used in criminal proceedings as an interim measure. The author notes an important role of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention which establishes the criteria for assessing the legality of interference with property rights. These criteria are analyzed in detail - legality, legitimate purpose, and necessity in a democratic society. This analysis is based on the extensive use of case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The author emphasizes that development of the legality criteria for cases where an individual’s rights are restricted in criminal proceedings is relevant today because when applying property seizure, the legislator requires that investigating judges take into account, inter alia, the reasonableness and proportionality of property rights restriction in criminal proceedings, and apply the least burdensome method of seizure which will not lead to suspension or excessive restriction of legitimate business activities of an individual, or any other consequences which may significantly affect the interests of other persons. Based on the summarized practice of rulings by investigating judges granting or denying the motions for property seizure submitted by investigators or prosecution, the author concludes that national courts gradually perceive the novels and requirements of the ECHR law and practice; however, most often, when a decision is made on such a motion filed by an investigator, the rationale of a respective ruling contains the standard argument of a general character and cites relevant articles of the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine without any attempt to analyze the legality of the restriction, the purpose of such a restrictions, the proportionality of the State’s interference with the rights of an individual consistent with a respective purpose. But it is the proper systematic, logical, and consistent argumentation which is important and which, as a rule, is lacking in such rulings.

The article develops and proposes a model of logical reasoning which investigating judges may follow to correctly formulate the rationale part of the decision granting or denying the motion for property seizure. The author emphasizes that legitimacy of the purpose of property seizure is established with due regard for the requirements of legislation. A measure is reasonable if its application is objectively needed in the presence of certain grounds and conditions. A measure is suitable if it helps to achieve the intended purpose. A measure is necessary if there is no other measure which is equally suitable but less burdensome for a person concerned, and besides, if it is necessary to resolve an urgent social problem. A measure may be considered proportionate if it involves such encumbrances to be imposed on a person, with due regard for all of the circumstances and risks, which will be proportionate to the purpose to be achieved by applying this restriction. At the final stage, an assessment is made of whether the intended result is commensurate, taking into account all of the analyzed conditions, with the restriction of a person’s right to peaceful possession of property.

The proposed model of reasoning is universal and, in cases where a property seizure decision should be made, is capable of limiting a law enforcer’s discretion and protecting an individual from arbitrariness of public authorities, and it also may become a methodical basis for a criminal procedural decision to be adopted.

Bibliography

Authored books

1. Barak A, Proportionality. Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press 2012) (in English).

2. Harris D and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2014) (in English).

3. Fulei T, Zastosuvannia Konventsii pro zakhyst prav liudyny i osnovopolozhnykh svobod ta praktyky Yevropeiskoho Sudu z prav liudyny pry zdiisnenni pravosuddia [Application of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Practice of the European Court of Human Rights in the Administration of Justice] (VAITE 2017) (in Ukrainian).

Journal articles

4. Bazhanov A, ‘Obosnovanye pryntsypa sorazmernosty v praktyke Federalnoho Konstytutsyonnoho Suda Hermanyy (1950-1960 hh.)’ [‘Justification of the Principle of Proportionality in the Practice of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (1950-1960)’] (2018) 5 Vestnyk Unyversyteta ymeny O. E. Kutafyna (MHIuA) 159-168 (in Russian).

5. Bazhanov A, ‘Problemy realyzatsyy pryntsypa sorazmernosty v sudebnoi praktyke’ [‘Problems of Realization of the Principle of Proportionality in Judicial Practice’] [2018] 6(13) Trudy Ynstytuta hosudarstva y prava RN 124-157 (in Russian).

6. Dudash T, ‘Praktyka Yevropeiskoho sudu z prav liudyny: hermenevtychnyi analiz’ [The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights: hermeneutic analysis] (2009) 21 Praktyka Yevropeiskoho sudu z prav liudyny: zahalnoteoretychni doslidzhennia, Seriia I. Doslidzhennia ta referaty 26-40 (in Ukrainian).

7. Foskulle A, ‘Pryntsyp sorazmernosty’ [‘Principle of Proportionality’] [2015] 1(104) Sravnytelnoe konstytutsyonnoe obozrenye 159-63 (in Russian).

8. Hiulumian V, ‘Pryntsypy tolkovanyia Evropeiskoi konventsyy prav cheloveka (krytyka y zashchyta)’ [Principles of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (criticism and protection)] [2015] 3(45) Zhurnal konstytutsyonnoho pravosudyia 6-18 (in Russian).

9. Koen-Elyia M i Porat Y, ‘Amerykanskyi metod vzveshyvanyia ynteresov y nemetskyi test na proportsyonalnost: ystorycheskye korny’ [‘American Method of Weighing the Interests in German Test on Proportionality: Historical Roots’] (2011) 3 Sravnytelnoe konstytutsyonnoe obozrenye 59-81 (in Russian).

10. Pohrebniak S, ‘Pryntsyp proportsiinosti u sudovii diialnosti’ [‘Principle of Proportionality in Judicial Activity’] (2012) 2 Filosofiia prava i zahalna teoriia prava 49-55 (in Ukrainian).

11. Rabinovych P ta Fedyk S, ‘Osoblyvosti tlumachennia yurydychnykh norm shchodo prav liudyny (za materialamy praktyky Yevropeiskoho sudu z prav liudyny)’ [‘Peculiarities of Interpreting of the Legal Norms Concerning Human Rights (based on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’)] (2004) 5 Pratsi Lvivskoi laboratorii prav liudyny i hromadianyna Naukovo-doslidnoho instytutu derzhavnoho budivnytstva ta mistsevoho samovriaduvannia akademii pravovykh nauk Ukrainy 124 (in Ukrainian).

12. Tsakyrakys S, ‘Proportsyonalnost: posiahatelstvo na prava cheloveka?’ [‘Proportionality: Encroachment on Human Rights?’] [2011] 2(81) Sravnytelnoe konstytutsyonnoe obozrenye 47-68 (in Russian).

Dissertations

13. Bazhanov A, ‘Sorazmernost kak pryntsyp prava’ [‘Proportionality as the Principle of Law’] (dys kand yuryd nauk, 2019) (in Russian).

14. Yevtushok Yu, ‘Pryntsyp proportsiinosti yak neobkhidna skladova verkhovenstva prava’ [‘Principle of roportionality as Necessary Component of the Rule of Law’] (dys kand yuryd nauk, 2015) (in Ukrainian).