In recent decades, artificial intelligence and its place in the legal system have become increasingly the subject of legal research, the number of which is growing exponentially. One of the most popular issues raised in these works is the legal nature of artificial intelligence. Such research is relevant due to at least two interrelated factors. First, artificial intelligence is widely used in various spheres of public life, and the average consumer may be faced with the use of artificial intelligence in their daily lives. This determines the task to find legal forms of placing artificial intelligence technologies in civil circulation. Secondly, artificial intelligence technology is something new for law, nothing like it has existed before. And it is a combination of artificial intelligence of two elements: 1) objective (“artificial”) – one that does not exist in nature, created by man using the achievements of science and technology; 2) subjective (“intelligence”) – the ability to think, understand and learn, instead of doing things automatically. And this poses the task for scientists to find a place for artificial intelligence in the system of elements of legal relations (“object” or “subject”).

The purpose of this article is to identify the advantages and disadvantages of the approach according to which artificial intelligence, depending on the situation, can be considered either as an object or as a subject of legal relations.

Particular attention in the article is paid to the study of the theory of Teilrechtsfähigkeit developed in German law and its use to determine the legal nature of artificial intelligence.

In conclusion, the advantages of applying the theory of Teilrechtsfähigkeit to artificial intelligence are formulated: 1) provides a differentiated approach to the distinction between artificial intelligence, which has a legal regime of the object, from that granted the legal status of the subject; 2) provides an opportunity to avoid difficulties in applying the quality criterion of compliance of technical capabilities of artificial intelligence with the minimum requirements of legal personality, both volitional and intellectual; 3) creates conditions for the introduction of “dynamic” legal capacity of artificial intelligence, which may change depending on the functions it performs.

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Theses

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Websites

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