The article examines the peculiarities of reforming the procedure for the selection of judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as one of the conditions for integration into the EU. Democracy without some form of constitutional control is considered insufficient. The European Court of Human Rights succinctly and succinctly defined that a central aspect of the rule of law requires that any legal act that affects the position of any legal entity is potentially subject to judicial review. Constitutional courts are counter-majoritarian by nature, so they cannot be tied to the majority in power, and this is why the practice of appointing judges by political actors creates problems, since it is often the majority that has the right to appoint judges, and in this connection there is a risk of their independence .

It was also emphasized that reforming the procedure for appointing judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is necessary not only in order to bring the Ukrainian model in line with the rules and practices of European systems for selecting judges of constitutional or supreme courts, in particular Germany, Lithuania, Spain, the USA or Estonia. This is due to the fact that the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine face a weighty and unique task of «protecting the Constitution of Ukraine» against possible encroachments on it by various authorities, in particular the legislative one. Constitutional «justice» cannot be improvised, and the obvious incompetence of judges can be reflected in the decisions of the body of constitutional jurisdiction, which must be based on sound reasoning and the common position of the court within the time limits set by the law and regulations.

Constitutional democracy is based on the ideal of a clear division of powers, and therefore the best method of selecting judges of constitutional courts should be able to: a) guarantee or maximize political independence; b) determine the judge’s qualities and experience in the field of constitutional law or professional competence. For the proper performance of their functions, judges must be professionally competent, politically impartial and independent from undue influence, therefore the selection of judges of the constitutional court using a two-stage process is successful: pre-selection of suitable candidates through integrity checks and certification, i.e. selection of candidates who have the appropriate (legal) qualification. In the process of selecting judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, it is important to take into account such factors as the independence of the judiciary from the executive and legislative powers. It was concluded that when forming a constitutional court, it is important to reconcile and balance two potentially opposite needs, namely: the independence of the body of constitutional jurisdiction from the interference of state authorities and to ensure the professional standards and integrity of the judge of the Constitutional Court.

Bibliography

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Edited books

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Websites

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