The article examines the independence of judges as a constitutional and institutional guarantee of human rights protection in Ukraine. The purpose of this article is to analyze the existing constitutional and legal mechanisms for ensuring the independence of judges in Ukraine, particularly in the context of the President’s powers as a subject involved in the judicial appointment, as well as to argue the author’s position regarding the limits of executive influence within the system of checks and balances. The legal and regulatory framework for the functioning of the judiciary is examined, as well as the role of the President of Ukraine in staffing the judicial system, in particular in the aspects of appointing judges and exercising the right of veto. Particular attention is paid to the challenges of judicial reform, the influence of political factors, the practice of disciplinary liability of judges and the compliance of the national model with international standards. Based on the results of the analysis, proposals are formulated to increase the effectiveness of mechanisms for guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary in Ukraine. This study underscores that the issue of judicial independence requires not only legislative entrenchment but also effective implementation in the daily practice of state institutions. Ukrainian legislation must be directed not towards declarative measures, but towards the genuine depoliticization of procedures for the selection, appointment, transfer, and disciplinary accountability of judges. A key task for Ukraine is not merely the formal proclamation of the principle of separation of powers, but its actual and systematic implementation across all spheres of the judiciary’s functioning. In the absence of such changes, constitutionally guaranteed guarantees of human rights and freedoms, despite their formal reflection in national legislation, will lack real legal significance.

Bibliography

Authored books

1. Albert R, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (Oxford University Press 2019).

2. Dworkin R, Law’s Empire (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1986). Edited and translated books

3. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (trans. Thomas Nugent, 2 vols. (New York: The Colonial Press, 1899).

Journal articles

4. Levinson S V, ‘Is “Judicial Independence” a Self-Evident Good?: Some Dissenting Reflections’ [2023] 17 University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy 138.

5. Dziadevych V, ‘Prava ta obov’iazky suddiv u vidstavtsi’ [2024] 1(43) Naukovi perspektyvy 631–640 (in Ukrainian).

6. Pushkarenko S, Falkovskyi A, ‘Instytutsionalna skladova chastyna mekhanizmu zakhystu prav liudyny’ [2022] 2(62) Naukovi pratsi Mizhrehionalnoi akademii upravlinnia personalom. Politychni nauky ta publichne upravlinnia [2022] 2(62) 136–141 (in Ukrainian).

7. Riznyk S, ‘Pro nezalezhnist sudovoi vlady v Ukraini: konstytutsiini vyklyky sohodennia’ [2019] 3 Ukrainskyi chasopys konstytutsiinoho prava 3–15 (in Ukrainian).