| Article title | Informal Influence on the Judiciary: Balancing Democratic Oversight and Reputational Pressure |
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| Authors |
Lidiia Moskvych
Doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminal Procedure, Yaroslav the Wise National Law University (Kharkiv, Ukraine) ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7339-3982 l.m.moskvych@nlu.edu.ua
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| Journal name | Legal journal «Law of Ukraine» (Ukrainian version) |
| Journal issue | 3 / 2026 |
| Pages | 168 - 183 |
| ISSN (print) | 1026-9932 |
| ISSN (online) | 2310-323X |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.33498/louu-2026-03-168 |
| Received | 08.04.2026 |
| Accepted | 23.04.2026 |
| Published | 30.04.2026 |
| Abstract | This article examines the phenomenon of informal influence on the judiciary in contemporary democratic systems through the lens of the interaction between law, politics, and civil society. It is argued that traditional approaches to judicial independence, focused on formal safeguards and state interference, do not fully capture the complexity of the current configuration of influences. Drawing on the theory of legal mobilization, civil society is conceptualized as an active actor shaping the judicial system through legal, communicative, and reputational mechanisms. The article introduces the concept of strategic reputational power, understood as the capacity to shape public evaluations, define standards of judicial integrity, and influence expectations regarding judicial decisions. This type of influence operates indirectly and may produce a “chilling effect” on judicial behavior, thereby affecting judges’ internal independence. The study also explores the phenomenon of institutional asymmetry, which reflects the imbalance between the significant influence exercised by non-state actors and the lack of corresponding accountability mechanisms. Based on a comparative analysis, including the experience of Ukraine and other transitional democracies, it is demonstrated that the judiciary operates within a hybrid environment where democratic oversight coexists with elements of reputational pressure and informational influence. The article substantiates the need to take into account informal mechanisms of influence and to ensure transparency as a key condition for maintaining a balance between civil society participation and judicial independence. |
| Keywords | judicial independence; informal influence; civil society; reputational power; legal mobilization; institutional asymmetry |
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