| Article title | Comparative Legal Analysis of the Models for Forming the Judiciary in Switzerland and Ukraine |
|---|---|
| Authors |
Pavlo Slobodianiuk
Candidate of Law, Judge of the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv (Kyiv, Ukraine) ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8016-9741 pavlo12061981@gmail.com
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| Journal name | Legal journal «Law of Ukraine» (Ukrainian version) |
| Journal issue | 3 / 2026 |
| Pages | 219 - 233 |
| ISSN (print) | 1026-9932 |
| ISSN (online) | 2310-323X |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.33498/louu-2026-03-219 |
| Received | 22.07.2025 |
| Accepted | 23.04.2026 |
| Published | 30.04.2026 |
| Abstract | In the context of ensuring the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, a key task of a legal state is the formation of a professional, impartial, and honest judicial corps. In Ukraine, where judicial reform is ongoing, issues such as political influence, corruption risks, and low public trust in the judicial system remain highly relevant. A comparative analysis of the models for forming the judiciary in Switzerland and Ukraine allows for the identification of effective mechanisms to guarantee judicial independence, which is particularly important in the context of Ukraine’s European integration and the improvement of its judicial system. The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative legal analysis of the models of forming the judiciary in Ukraine and Switzerland, aimed at identifying key differences in the procedures for selecting judges, assessing their integrity, and ensuring their independence. The analysis showed that the Swiss model of forming the judiciary is based on constitutional principles and parliamentary oversight, where the United Federal Assembly elects judges based on party proportionality. At the same time, cantonal autonomy allows for the application of various selection procedures, including direct elections by the population. In Switzerland, judicial independence is ensured through strict requirements for education, professional experience, and ethical integrity, as well as through mechanisms of self-regulation and financial transparency. The Ukrainian model, regulated by the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”, provides for competitive selection via the High Qualification Commission of Judges and the High Council of Justice, with the involvement of the Public Integrity Council. However, political influence risks remain in Ukraine, particularly due to the President’s role in judicial appointments, along with shortcomings in integrity assessment and the unification of evaluation criteria. The comparison demonstrates that the Swiss system more effectively neutralizes political influence due to a high level of legal culture and institutional stability, whereas Ukraine still requires improvements in procedures to ensure genuine independence. The Swiss experience demonstrates the effectiveness of combining political oversight with clear legal standards and democratic mechanisms that foster public trust in the judiciary. Ukraine, despite its formal compliance with international standards, faces challenges related to political pressure, corruption risks, and weak public oversight. To improve the Ukrainian model, it is advisable to strengthen the transparency of competitive procedures, unify integrity evaluation criteria, and reduce political influence, using the Swiss experience as a guide for reforms. |
| Keywords | judiciary; judicial selection; judicial power; political impartiality; rule of law; comparative analysis |
| References | |
| Electronic version | Download |