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Article title Constitutionalism in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers and Fundamental Rights.
Authors
Vitaliy Kovalchuk
Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of Theory of Law and Constitutionalism at the Educational and Scientific Institute of Law, Psychology and Innovative Education, Lviv Polytechnic National University (Lviv, Ukraine) ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7523-2098 Vitalii.B.Kovalchuk@lpnu.ua
Journal name Legal journal «Law of Ukraine» (Ukrainian version)
Journal issue 9 / 2026
Pages 85 - 104
Received 26.08.2026
Accepted 28.09.2026
Published 30.09.2026
Abstract

The doctrine of constitutionalism is effective and efficient in peacetime. However, when society and the state face crises and extraordinary circumstances that pose a threat to the principles of constitutionalism and even to the sovereignty of the state, “general constitutionalism” begins to operate in a manner that enables it to protect itself. “General constitutionalism” thus transforms into “militant constitutionalism”, which is inherent in the very nature of constitutionalism.

The transformation of “general constitutionalism” into its variant, “militant constitutionalism”, under extraordinary circumstances is possible provided that the state functions within the framework of the Constitution and the decisions of constitutional jurisdiction bodies. Even under extraordinary circumstances, the executive branch, which seeks to expand the scope of its discretionary powers, must act within the framework of the Constitution. Deviation from the Constitution should be regarded as a departure from constitutionalism towards authoritarianism, which poses a direct threat to constitutional democracy. In times of crisis, particularly during war, the executive branch acquires discretionary powers that are only partially limited or controlled. Under extraordinary circumstances, the executive branch is best placed to deal with emergencies. It may, at its discretion, decide how to apply these emergency powers to any given situation and is not accountable to any branch of government during a state of emergency. The executive branch is considered the most effective in implementing foreign and national security policies. In this context, perceived advantages such as secrecy, efficiency, and access to a wide range of sources of information are often cited. One consequence of this structural advantage is that the executive branch is often the first to respond to emergencies. When this is combined with the capacity of emergencies to generate consensus, the other branches of government will have to catch up with the executive branch. A constitutional state must provide for and enshrine in its Constitution emergency powers to address extraordinary situations, including war. It must provide legal responses to any conceivable emergency. If the state does not have at its disposal such a comprehensive set of emergency powers within the framework of the ordinary system of laws, then either the state will be unable to defend itself against its enemies or, more likely, the executive branch will resort to extraordinary means that violate the law in order to do whatever it deems necessary for the survival of the state. Despite the practical component of the concept of militant democracy, which can be effective in times of crisis, it may also contain hidden threats of authoritarianism that are likely to manifest themselves in post-crisis conditions. In order to prevent the abuse of extraordinary powers granted to state authorities, a number of important factors should be taken into account. These factors should not only be institutionally established at the level of the Constitution and legislation but also legitimized at the level of civic legal consciousness. Militant democracy will remain within the constitutional paradigm only if it is able to conceptually and institutionally prevent the abuse of opportunities to restrict fundamental rights or, more realistically, at least keep such abuses within reasonable limits. A clear distinction between the legal regulation of types of actions permitted in a democratic society and the circle of legitimate political actors based on their goals or ideologies can serve as a safeguard against the abuse of emergency powers. All democratic regimes must necessarily provide for legal norms that define what constitutes an expression of the popular will and prohibit certain types of behavior. In addition to prohibiting certain types of behavior, the concept of militant democracy must provide for the prohibition of specific actors based on their goals or ideology. Under any political regime, a balance must be maintained between individual rights and public interests, which is a primary responsibility of the judiciary, particularly constitutional jurisdiction bodies.

Keywords constitutionalism; crisis (extraordinary) conditions; state of emergency; extraordinary powers; fundamental, basic (fundamental) rights; militant democracy
References

Authored books

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